JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
disallowed by the formal condition Glymour proposes. The point of the fourth example, however, was somewhat more complex. It consisted of two sets of axioms which (to my mind, at least) bring with them quite different relevance-relations: a certain confirmation seems illegitimate on the first set of axioms, but quite legitimate on the second. However, the two axiom sets entail the same set of first-order consequences; on the classical approach, the two theories are identical. Since Glymour's account was based on the classical conception, I suggested that bootstrapping could not correctly assess evidential relevance in both cases, even if modifications were made to deal with my first three examples.
The two axiom sets had the following forms: The problematic confirmation allowed evidence of the form E: Fa&Ha to confirm Al. The original bootstrap account allowed confirmation in both cases; the modified account allows it in neither. Since this is not one of the cases in which Glymour says that his account is narrow minded, I assume that he does not share my intuition that the confirmation is legitimate for the second axiom set. Part of the reason for this, I suspect, is that the original interpretation I gave for the axioms was not maximally convincing on this score. What I would like to do here, then, is to give some examples of cases which show more clearly that evidence of the form E can indeed legitimately support hypotheses of the form Al, relative to a theory whose natural first-order axiomatization has the form II. Consider a theory which consists of the hypothesis that all AIDS victims are infected by a certain virus V, along with the hypothesis that an AIDS victim will have antibody B in his blood just in case he is infected by virus V. The natural first-order representations of the hypotheses are as follows:
HI: (x)(Ax D Vx) H2: (x)(Ax D (Bx Vx)).
Now how would a scientist who believed both of these hypotheses go about confirming HI? It seems to me that she would very likely test AIDS victims for the presence of the antibody, and that she would (justifiably) regard finding the antibody in an AIDS victim as evidence for the hypothesis that all AIDS victims were infected with the virus.2 However, 2This example is obviously simplified: for example, we might not think that every single AIDS victim would have the relevant antibody in his blood, especially considering the on Glymour's new account, such a confirmation would be ruled illegitimate. Finding the antibody in AIDS victims would be ruled irrelevant to HI, even though our theory contains H2! Similarly, suppose that a paleontologist believes that all halmasauruses were avid jumpers. How would he test this belief? Well, if he also believes that halmasauruses had fractured heel bones just in case they were avid jumpers, it seems to me that he might well regard halmasaurus fossils with fractured heel bones as confirming his hypothesis about their habits. The structure of the theory is identical to the previous one; again, Glymour's revised account would deny the legitimacy of the scientist's reasoning.
If my intuitions about confirmation are correct in the above cases, the narrow-mindedness induced by Glymour's modification of bootstrapping is indeed much more serious than he indicates.3 And it should also be kept in mind that, on the classical approach to theories, these examples are indistinguishable from the absurd confirmations Glymour modified his account to eliminate. Thus any further modification which resulted in allowing confirmations of the above form would (given Glymour's basic approach to theories) necessitate accepting clearly unacceptable confirmations along with them.
Still, if one thought that it was better for a formal confirmation theory to condemn the innocent than to let the guilty go free, one might think that rejecting a few legitimate confirmations-even quite a few-was an acceptable price to pay for a restriction that enabled the bootstrap account to provide a firm sufficient condition for evidential relevance.4 In the next section, however, I will argue that the revised account cannot even do this.
debilitating effect the disease has on the immune system. However, some of the reasoning employed in actual studies on AIDS is remarkably close to that described in the text. The following is from a recent book on AIDS: "[I]t was seroepidemiologic evidence that argued most strongly that HTLV-III does, in fact, cause the disease. For these studies, sera from a large number of patients with AIDS or ARC . . . and from normal control subjects were analyzed for antibodies to HTLV-II. . . . The results of testing over 1000 sera . . . demonstrated that over 90% of all AIDS and ARC patients were seropositive for HTLV-III. This was in contrast to the control group. . . ." (Gallo et al. 1985) . Thus it seems to me that the suggestion that finding the antibody in AIDS victims provides no relevant evidence for Hi relative to a theory containing Hi and H2 is a clear distortion of scientific practice. 3In arguing for his own restriction on bootstrapping, Jan Zytkow (1986) presents different, more complex scientific examples intended to show that Glymour's restriction eliminates desirable confirmations. (For more on Zytkow's proposed condition, see the Appendix.) 4It should be noted, however, that narrow-mindedness (that is, failure to provide a necessary condition for confirmation) presents a serious obstacle to one of Glymour's main philosophical objectives. As Paul Horwich points out (Horwich 1983 , pp. 55-56), failure to satisfy a merely sufficient condition for evidential relevance cannot provide an explanation of evidential irrelevance, something that Glymour clearly wants his account to do.
II
Before discussing my examples of gullibility, I would like to take a quick look at the restriction which is at the heart of the new, tougher, bootstrap condition. Officially, it reads as follows: R: For all i, H must not entail that the hypothesis Ti used in computing a quantity Qi, occurring essentially in H, is equivalent to an hypothesis Ri whose essential vocabulary is a proper subset of the essential vocabulary of Ti. (Glymour 1983a, p. 627) Glymour explains that "R says in effect that the computations must restrict the quantities occurring essentially in H in a way that is independent of the restriction that H itself imposes on its quantities" (1983a, p. 627). He says that this requirement is intuitively sensible, but he doesn't say why.
Now it seems to me that there is a certain intuitive plausibility to R, at least on the surface, for the following reason: the computations it eliminates look circular in a certain way. An auxiliary hypothesis that violates R seems dependent on the hypothesis being tested, because in a sense it says nothing about one of its quantities that is not already said by the hypothesis being tested. Computations that actually use the tested hypothesis as an auxiliary (which Glymour originally intended to allow, giving the bootstrap theory its name) are merely a special case of this kind of circularity or dependence; and indeed, they will typically be disallowed in the revised bootstrap account.
Furthermore, it seems to me that it is precisely this intuitive dependence of the auxiliaries on the tested hypotheses that is at the root of the unacceptability of the confirmations Glymour is trying to disallow. Thus, if a syntactic test could be found for this intuitive dependence, the gullibility problem might be solved.5 But while the motivations behind the new condition are reasonable enough, it seems to me that Glymour's test fails to disclose intuitive dependence in general, and thus that R fails to remove the essential gullibility of the bootstrap condition.
The first example of gullibility I want to discuss is simply a minor variation of one of the original examples R was introduced to eliminate. One of these original examples of gullibility consisted of a theory having two (intuitively) independent hypotheses of the following forms: H1: (x)(Rx D Bx) H2: (x)(Fx D Gx) 5The examples in the last section suggest, of course, that a condition that picked out the objectionable cases would also catch some legitimate cases in the same syntactic net. But while this certainly suggests that the intuitive dependence will prove elusive, it does not show that no interesting syntactic sufficient condition for acceptable auxiliaries can be found.
H1 was intended to represent the famous Raven Hypothesis; H2 was uninterpreted, but here we may take it to represent the hypothesis that only Gods can fly. The original bootstrap account permitted us, absurdly, to confirm H2 by spotting a flying black raven. The relevant computation made use of an auxiliary hypothesis H* that, intuitively speaking, is included in the theory only because H2 is: H*: (x)((Rx D Bx) -(Fx D Gx)).
As Glymour points out, condition R successfully prevents us from using H* to confirm H2, because H2 entails the equivalence of H* with H1, which uses only a proper part of the vocabulary in H*.
Consider, however, a slight variation on our example. Suppose that our theory is supplemented by another hypothesis, say, that all winged things can fly: 
Wx Rx Bx Wx
This confirmation is certainly no less absurd than the original one. The strategy is in fact exactly the same as in the previous example; only the direct measurement of F has been replaced by indirect measurement through H3. Intuitively, the quantity G is still "measured" by assuming the hypothesis being tested. And the "possiblity of disconfirmation" still rests on the possible failure of HI, an unrelated part of the theory, not on the possible failure of H2. But while the auxiliary hypothesis used in the right hand computation is intuitively dependent on H2, this dependence is not disclosed by the syntactic test R; thus the computation passes muster in the revised bootstrap account.6
The second example of gullibility that I would like to discuss is related 6To be precise, the auxiliary hypotheses used in the computations would have to be weakened to meet condition 6 in the revised account, which requires using the weakest possible hypotheses that satisfy the other five conditions. But since the condition requires weakening only to the extent that confirmation still occurs, my point is unaffected. Since fulfilling requirement 6 seems to me to detract significantly from the perspicuity of the examples, I'll ignore it in the rest of this paper. This streamlined version of the computation meets Glymour's T & E requirements, and also meets the requirement Edidin proposes in response to the expanded version. And-importantly for our present purposes-it also meets the more stringent requirements of Glymour's revised bootstrap account. Nevertheless, it seems just as clear a case of gullibility as does Edidin's original example. The same evidence is used in the same way to confirm the same hypothesis relative to the same theory. The "measurement" of y still depends intuitively on assuming the truth of the tested hypothesis; although H1 is not mentioned explicitly, the auxiliary used in the right hand computation is intuitively dependent on it. The "possible counterevidence" would still have to result from a breakdown of H2 or H3, not from failure of the hypothesis being tested. In short, the gullibility problem pointed out in the original example remains unabated.
To On Glymour's new account, this man can claim that the very same evidence I cited (our neighbor's wearing a sudra while praying to AhuraMazda) supports his views on the long-term prospects for Zoroastrians! It might be objected that while the bootstrap account is clearly too gullible here, this is hardly a realistic scientific example; and that true scientific examples with this structure would be so rare that this gullibility should be seen as unfortunate, but acceptable. However, I see no reason to doubt that "confirmations" of this type are often possible in real scientific theories (though no scientist would bother to consider them, of course). Laws which assert a determinate enough relation between two theoretical quantities will often be "confirmable" simply by finding two different ways of measuring one of the quantities. In fact, counterintuitive confirmations of a very similar type will even be possible in the case of Kepler's laws, which is Glymour's central example of a scientific case of evidential irrelevance.
Kepler's third law states that some constant ratio K will hold between the period and the 3/2 power of the mean distance from the sun of any two planets. Clearly, observations of a single planet should not confirm the third law. In Theory and Evidence, Glymour claimed that even if we treated K as a single quantity, we wouldn't be able to bootstrap-confirm the third law by observations of a single planet (say, Mars). If we tried, for instance, to use observations of Mars to determine not only K(Mars) but also K(Venus) (in order to test the third law), we would have to rely on the third law itself; and this circularity would necessitate violation of one of the conditions of bootstrapping.
As it turned out, computations involving the objectionable kind of circularity did not always violate the original version of the bootstrap account (see Christensen 1983); indeed, Glymour's new condition is in part intended to block these illegitimate "confirmations" of Kepler's third law (see Glymour 1983a). However, as we will see, the revised version of bootstrapping is vulnerable to essentially the same type of example. I would like to show this in a way that will first demonstrate how Glymour's restriction is supposed to work, in the hope that this will make clearer the reason for its eventual failure.
Let us begin by supposing merely that Kepler had more than one way of measuring the period and mean distance from the sun, and hence the K-value, of a planet. I'll represent these methods of measurement by HI and H2, and Kepler's third law by H3: The second of these problems in particular does seem to bear out Glymour's reasons for instituting the new requirement. The strange hypothesis used in the right hand computation depends on the tested hypothesis in an intuitively obvious way, and Glymour's vocabulary restriction appears to pick up on just this fact: one might put it, loosely, by saying that the strange hypothesis says nothing about the extra quantified variable that is not said by the tested hypothesis. In this way, the syntactic structure of the strange hypothesis does look like an indicator of what we intuitively express by saying that part of the content of the strange hypothesis "comes from" or is "dependent on" the tested hypothesis. And it is this intuition that is at the root of our rejecting the computation as unacceptably circular.
Unfortunately, intuitive dependence between hypotheses is hard to catch syntactically. In this case, it turns out that a very weak assumption about our astronomical theory allows the construction of an intuitively unacceptable confirmation that does not violate the new vocabulary restriction 8I am supposing here (with no good reason) that Glymour intends quantified variables to be included in a sentence's "essential vocabulary". If not, the case just discussed already constitutes a counterexample to the revised account.
(or the Theory and Evidence consistency-of-counterevidence condition, or Edidin's condition either). We need only assume that the astronomical theory contains some observation-predicate P (say, "is bright") that is true of Venus. We then consider the following computation: Nevertheless, it is perfectly clear that the third law cannot really have been tested at all by this computation. No observation of Venus has been made which bears even remotely on the third law holding; the "measurement" of K(Venus) is intuitively parasitic on the assumption that the third law holds. Any "confirmation" obtained through this computation will thus be trivially circular. The "possibility of disconfirmation" is also fully independent from any failure of the third law; essentially, it rests on the possible failure of an unrelated part of the theory (the part which says that the two measurements of Mars will agree with one another).
It seems to me that this example clearly shows that the gullibility of the modified account does indeed infect the kinds of cases Glymour is centrally interested in explaining. It also shows how the restriction R, however well motivated, fails to accomplish its purpose. As in the simpler and more artificial cases, R is just not capable of capturing the intuitive dependence between those hypotheses used in a computation, and the hypothesis being tested. Thus it seems that the basic source of gullibility in the original account remains; and, as a result, the added restriction completely fails to solve the bootstrap account's problem.9 91t should be noted that attempts have been made to solve the gullibility problem using restrictions other than R. Such restrictions have been put forth by Jan M. Zytkow (1986) and by John Earman and Glymour (1988). Neither of these conditions succeeds in disallowing counterintuitive confirmations of the sort discussed above. For details, see the Appendix.
I should also note here that Thomas R. Grimes (1987) has pointed out that a very different sort of "promiscuity" infects bootstrapping. Grimes shows that almost any piece of evidence will confirm almost any theory, relative to some true theory or other. The "theories" Grimes invokes to make his point are essentially conditionals formed from the evidence sentences and instances of the tested hypothesis-not the kind of theory relative to which we typically want to assess confirmation. Nevertheless, Grimes' point raises interesting questions, especially as bootstrapping gives us no well-developed way of assessing the confirmation of the theories relative to which we confirm individual hypotheses.
III
The examples discussed so far show that satisfaction of the modified bootstrap account is neither necessary nor sufficient for confirmation. One could, of course, always modify the account still further; and it might be hoped that some such further modification could really eliminate (or markedly reduce) the account's gullibility, providing a sufficient condition for evidential relevance. However, some of the examples discussed in the last section seem to me to provide good reason for pessimism on this score.
The examples in section I showed that, given Glymour's basic approach to theories, his exclusion of certain unacceptable confirmations was necessarily accompanied by exclusion of other, perfectly reasonable, confirmations. That point having been made, we went on in section II to see whether rejecting the reasonable confirmations had at least allowed the modified account to provide a usable sufficient condition for evidential relevance; we found that, in fact, it had not. But nothing in section II militated against the possibility that some re-modified bootstrap account could succeed in doing this.
Before discussing this question, I would like to make a simple methodological observation. It is obvious that we could give a trivial bootstrapstyle sufficient condition for evidential relevance-a condition that excluded all confirmations would do that. The interesting question is whether a bootstrap-style account can provide an interesting or useful sufficient condition: a condition that excludes the undesirables while also letting in a significant fraction of the confirmations we favor. An interesting bootstrap account would have to be able, quite frequently, to discriminate between acceptable and unacceptable confirmations.
With this in mind, it is clear that the examples discussed in section I already give us some reason for pessimism about the prospects for a rerevised Glymourian account. They constitute cases in which no account which shares Glymour's basic approach to theories can discriminate between reasonable and unacceptable confirmations. In the present section, I want to show how some examples discussed in section II present additional, parallel difficulties for Glymour's approach.
Consider the "streamlined" variation on Edidin's example, discussed on page 650. If, instead of the axioms given there, the natural axioms of our theory were as follows:
H1: x= y H2: A = x H3: B= y; then testing the first hypothesis by measuring A and B would be entirely appropriate-in fact, it would seem to be a virtual paradigm of the sort of confirmation Glymour envisions. Yet the set of consequences entailed by these axioms is identical to the set entailed by the axioms discussed above, for which the same confirmation was clearly-again, almost paradigmatically-illegitimate. No account that takes into account only the logical structure of the set of first-order consequences of a theory will be able to discriminate between these virtual caricatures of evidential relevance and irrelevance.
Similarly, consider the following anthropological theory: Languages in group Z were spoken by all and only tribes in group E: H1: (x)(Zx-Ex); Any tribe using script S spoke language Z: H2: (x)(Sx D Zx); and E-tribes lived in structures of type P, and they were the only tribes to do so:
H3: (x)(Px Ex).
Suppose that we hold this theory, and that we find remains of a tribe who lived in P-structures and also used script S. It seems that we should be able to use this evidence in a perfectly reasonable way to confirm H1. In fact, our reasoning will look strikingly bootstrappy: we will use H2 to infer that our tribe spoke language Z, and use H3 to infer that our tribe was of group E; we will then have a positive Hempelian instance of our tested hypothesis. (It might also be noted that we could have found remains of a tribe who used script S without living in P-structures, thereby disconfirming H1).
The point of all this is, of course, that this perfectly reasonable confirmation is identical, from the point of view of logical structure, to the absurd confirmation in the "Zoroastrianism" example discussed above on page 651. Again, any way of tightening up the bootstrap account to eliminate the latter will eliminate the former at the same time. No account of confirmation that analyzes evidential relevance in terms of the logical structure of the set of first-order consequences of a theory can possibly discriminate between such cases of clear relevance and clear irrelevance. In light of these examples, as well as those discussed in section I, it seems highly unlikely that bootstrapping, with its classical approach to theories, can furnish us with a sufficient condition for evidential relevance that is at all useful or interesting.10
IV
The considerations in the last section suggest that the prospects for a further-revised version of bootstrapping are not promising. However, my reasons for pessimism on this score have been predicated explicitly on the assumption that bootstrapping remain tied to the classical approach to theories. Nothing in the above examples throws doubt on the prospects for a further-revised bootstrap-style account that, say, took "natural axiomatizations" of theories into account. Such an account would not be committed to the equivalence of the pairs of theories that I have argued must be treated non-equivalently.
Of course, such an account would have to be compared, for instance, to a version of hypothetico-deductivism that was also allowed access to the richer conception of theories. This is important, for if hypotheticodeductivism could account for evidential relevance, bootstrapping would lose much of its appeal. It is worth remembering that Glymour's main claim for the superiority of his account over the hypothetico-deductivist's is that the latter cannot account for relevance; yet he admits (1980, p. 39) that the hypothetico-deductivist might well be able to account for relevance if allowed to pick certain axiomatizations as privileged. Thus admitting privileged axiomatizations, while it may well be a step in the right direction for confirmation theory, might still not be a step which rendered bootstrapping particularly interesting.
Another alternative to the classical approach to theories would replace classical first-order logic with some alternative, such as a relevance logic or a logic of counterfactuals. Again, such an approach to theories might well allow differential treatment of the theory-pairs discussed above. And in fact, it has recently been argued (Waters 1987 ) that relevance logic can save hypothetico-deductivism from the irrelevance problems pointed out by Glymour. If the hypothetico-deductivist's problems with relevance are similar to the bootstrapper's (as I have suggested), then if Waters' account furnishes hope for hypothetico-deductivism, there may be hope make the discriminations discussed above does not amount to denying the "equivalence condition", which entails that confirmation relative to a theory T should not be affected by substituting a logically equivalent theory T' for T (see Earman and Glymour 1988, p. 262) .
The examples discussed above involve pairs of theories whose natural first-order axiomatizations yield identical sets of consequences. I do claim that we cannot substitute these theories for one another without affecting confirmation. But this requires abandoning the equivalence condition only if we adopt the classical approach of identifying theories with the set of consequences of their natural first-order axiomatizations. There are, of course, alternatives to this approach, such as using a different logic to represent our theories (this option-which actually constitutes one possibility for saving some form of bootstrapping-will be briefly discussed below).
for bootstrapping along the same road.11 Again, however, it is far from clear that such a readjustment will leave bootstrapping in any better position relative to its main competitor.
Thus at this point we do not know whether we could obtain useful results from a bootstrap-style account that jettisoned the classical approach to theories. But while we have seen no argument that such results are impossible, we have as yet seen no evidence suggesting that the approach is likely to produce a bootstrap account which could account for relevance better than hypothetico-deductivism. Thus I must remain guardedly pessimistic about the prospects for revising bootstrapping along these lines.
Before concluding, however, I would like to mention one more move that might be made on bootstrapping's behalf, a move which does not depend on abandoning Glymour's approach to theories. It has been suggested (Edidin 1981 ) that Glymour never claimed to be giving a complete account of confirmation. Perhaps bootstrapping will explain relevance only in combination with some other factors, or only for certain restricted classes of theory. For example, it might be held that bootstrapping doe's correctly determine relevance relations for deductively closed sets of first-order sentences; and that our intuitions to the contrary in the cases discussed above relate to the theories which I stated in English and which aren't adequately represented in the obvious first-order way.
The first thing to be noticed about this last way of seeing the bootstrap account is that, given the points made above about the Kepler's laws example, we would have to limit the strategy so severely as to prevent it from applying to the central case Glymour adduces in its defense. Such a limitation should, to say the least, raise serious questions about the interest of the account.
This brings up a more general point that is important here. It is true that, to the extent the claims made for bootstrapping are of a more limited nature, it will be harder to show the condition defective by means of a few simple examples. But care must be taken not to insulate the account from failure by depriving it of determinate content. We cannot simply assume that when the account accords with our intuitive judgments, it explains them; while when it disagrees with us, some other factor is operating in addition to-or instead of-bootstrapping. If a limited bootstrap account is to have any substance, it must include a general account of its own limitations, so that we may apply the condition independently of our intuitions about relevance in particular cases. Now I have no argument showing such an account to be impossible. Perhaps there are other factors which help explain relevance, yet which are not so explanatorily powerful as to leave the bootstrap strategy without significant work to do. At this point in the discussion, however, no such account has even been hinted at; and until one is, I see little reason to think that such an account will be found. So, again, I feel somewhat pessimistic about the prospects for this sort of revision of bootstrapping. 12 I would like to conclude by saying something about how we should go about assessing future incarnations of the bootstrap account. One of the main attractions of the account has been its ability to represent real scientific cases of confirmation by relevant evidence. But it is important to realize that in order to argue that some future version of bootstrapping is responsible for our judgments of evidential relevance, it will not be sufficient to point to a few-even quite a few-prominent scientific arguments that are roughly representable in bootstrap style. It will have to be shown that we generally refrain from performing or taking seriously tests that violate the account. And it will have to be shown that we (at least tend to) perform and take seriously tests that satisfy the account, when they are easily available.
This last stricture applies especially to any tests that use auxiliaries which are intuitively included in a theory because the tested hypothesis is included. As is clear from the examples discussed above, such "tests" are not hard to think up; thus, to the extent that any such tests are legitimate, they will surely have been performed and taken seriously.
I suspect, however, that the extent to which such confirmations are legitimate is very small, and thus that any viable account of evidential relevance will have to find a way of identifying and rejecting this sort of test. Auxiliaries which depend on the hypothesis being tested are the source of the trivializing circularity that characterizes all of the above-discussed examples of gullibility. Such auxiliaries are at the root of the problem that both the bootstrap account and the hypothetico-deductive account have with relevance; and they have so far proved resistant to characterization by standard first-order methods. In assessing the adequacy of any future version of bootstrapping, we must clearly take very special care to see whether it handles this particular sort of case correctly.
At present, we have seen no version of bootstrapping that comes close "A new proposal along somewhat similar lines has recently been made by Aron Edidin (1988). He suggests that we understand the purpose of bootstrapping in a new, and much more modest, way. On Edidin's proffered interpretation, we should not ask bootstrapping to make the kind of discriminations discussed above; thus Glymour should never have worried about the gullibility examples in the first place! Now it seems to me that the suggested weakening of the claims made for bootstrapping would rob the account of most, if not all, of its interest. However, detailed discussion of Edidin's proposal must await another occasion. to accomplishing this. Although there are, to be sure, many examples of correct scientific argument that are representable in roughly the bootstrap way, the same can be said for classical hypothetico-deductivism. In factand this strikes me as very important-we have seen no significant class of theories, real or artificial, in which bootstrapping can reliably discriminate between relevant and irrelevant confirmations. Thus at present, we have seen little reason to believe that bootstrapping will play any useful role at all in explaining evidential relevance.13 APPENDIX Some Other Attempts to Solve the Gullibility Problem Zytkow's intuition is that El should not disconfirm any part of T that is independent of H; independence is supposed to be captured by the "no shared consequences" clause in 13It might seem that one exception to my last claim could be provided by Glymour's bootstrap-style analysis (1983b) of fault-detection in logic circuits. A logic circuit can be represented by a system of equations specifying the output of each gate as a function of its inputs. This system of equations is in effect a theory of the circuit. Failure of a particular gate to conform to the equations is thus analogous to falsity of a particular hypothesis in a theory; and the problem of locating a particular faulty gate by measuring inputs and outputs of the circuit is analogous to selective confirmation or disconfirmation of particular hypotheses in a theory. Glymour describes a bootstrap-style procedure for solving this sort of problem, and notes that this procedure is equivalent to the Boolean derivative tests that are used in practice to locate gate-failures. Thus it would seem that in one real (if small) set of cases, a bootstrap-type procedure is useful in determining confirmational relevance relations.
However, a closer look at the actual bootstrap procedure employed by Glymour casts doubt on even this example. It turns out that Glymour's procedure involves not only bootstrap testing relative to the theory determined by the entire circuit-diagram in question, but another bootstrap test as well. This second bootstrap test is relativized to a special subtheory of the original one-a subtheory that is determined by deleting certain sections from the circuit diagram, then taking the set of equations determined by the truncated diagram. Now the individual sections of a circuit diagram correspond intuitively to the natural axioms of the theory determined by the diagram. Thus the special subtheory used by Glymour is essentially a subtheory determined by removing some of the natural axioms of the original theory. In other words, the special bootstrap-style procedure Glymour is employing in this set of examples is dependent on taking a certain natural axiomatization of the original theory as privileged. This is, of course, one way of dealing with bootstrapping's relevance problem; but, as noted above, once we make bootstrapping dependent on assuming privileged axiomatizations, the purported advantage of bootstrapping over H-D accounts may well evaporate. In fact, in this particular case Glymour explicitly notes that the results of the bootstrap procedure are equivalent to those obtainable by a H-D procedure which is allowed to take certain axioms as privileged! (2). He illustrates the workings of his condition in dealing with an example involving a
